Pojam presudivosti i Kantorowiczev pristup utvrđivanju sadržaja prava
| Autor: | Mario Krešić |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu Volume 69 Issue 5-6 |
| ISSN: | 1849-1154 0350-2058 |
| DOI: | 10.3935/zpfz.69.56.05 |
| Popis: | Kantorowiczev pojam presudivosti u njegovoj definiciji prava upućuje na karakterističan pristup utvrđivanju sadržaja prava. Ovaj pristup može se shvatiti kao kritika pozitivizma 19. stoljeća, ali i kao pristup koji pripada teorijama kritički usmjerenima prema pravnom pozitivizmu 20. stoljeća. U ovom članku analizirat ćemo Kantorowiczev pojam presudivosti, povezati ga s njegovim širim shvaćanjem sadržaja prava te pokazati kako se na temelju pojma presudivosti može uspostaviti razlika između Kantorowiczeve teorije i obje vrste pozitivističkih teorija. Razlike u odnosu na poslijeratni pozitivizam pokazat ćemo kroz usporedbu Kantorowiczeve teorije s teorijama H. L. A. Harta i Ronalda Dworkina. Kantorowicz’s concept of justiciability in his definition of law reveals a characteristic approach to the determination of the content of law. This approach can be understood as a critique of 19th century positivism as well as an approach belonging to the theories critically related to the theory of legal positivism of the 20th century. In this article, we will analyse the concept of justiciability, connect it with his broader understanding of the content of law, and explain how a distinction can be made between Kantorowicz’s theory and both types of positivistic theories on the basis of this concept. Differences in relation to post-war positivism will be demonstrated through a comparison of Kantorowicz’s theory with the theories of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|