Are we free to imagine what we choose?
| Autor: | Daniel Munro, Margot Strohminger |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of science
mental imagery Philosophy 05 social sciences General Social Sciences Metaphysics 06 humanities and the arts intentions to imagine 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 16. Peace & justice 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Truism Visualization Philosophy of language sensory imagination 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences imagination visualization Mental image |
| Zdroj: | Synthese |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-021-03314-1 |
| Popis: | It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college you have imagined the former rather than the latter because you intended to imagine King’s College. This is so even if the visual image you conjure up equally resembles either. This paper proposes two kinds of counterexamples to intentionalism and discusses their significance. In particular, it sketches a positive account of how many sensory imaginings get to be about what they are about, which explains how the causal history of our mental imagery can prevent us from succeeding in imagining what we intended. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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