Dividend policy: Shareholder rights and creditor rights under the impact of the global financial crisis
| Autor: | Xuan Minh Nguyen, Pascal Alphonse, Quoc Trung Tran |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Foreign Trade University, Hanoi, Vietnam (FTU), Lille University Management Lab - ULR 4999 (LUMEN), Université de Lille, Lille University ManageMENt lab - ULR 4999 (LUMEN) |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
[QFIN.GN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]
Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Creditor 05 social sciences Agency cost Financial system Dividend policy [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Shareholder loan Shareholder Expropriation 0502 economics and business Financial crisis Economics [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration Dividend 050207 economics ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS |
| Zdroj: | Economic Modelling Economic Modelling, 2017, 64, pp.502-512. ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2017.03.010⟩ Economic Modelling, Elsevier, 2017, 64, pp.502-512. ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2017.03.010⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0264-9993 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econmod.2017.03.010 |
| Popis: | The extant literature shows that shareholder and creditor rights positively affect corporate payout policy in a static macroeconomic environment. This study examines how the effects of shareholder and creditor rights on dividend policy change under the impact of the global financial crisis. We posit that this exogenous shock increases agency costs of both shareholders and creditors. With a sample of 133,631 firm-year observations from 23,890 firms incorporated in 41 countries, we find that both shareholder and creditor rights are less effective in dividend decisions in the post-crisis period and the extent of shareholder (creditor) expropriation in the post-crisis period is larger when creditors (shareholders) are adequately protected. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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