The evolution of social learning rules: Payoff-biased and frequency-dependent biased transmission
| Autor: | Kevin N. Laland, Luc-Alain Giraldeau, Jeremy Kendal |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Department of Anthropology [Durham University], Durham University, Département des Sciences Biologiques [Montréal], Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), University of St Andrews [Scotland] |
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
0106 biological sciences
Statistics and Probability Value (ethics) media_common.quotation_subject Culture Population Cultural evolution Social learning strategy Models Psychological Biology 010603 evolutionary biology 01 natural sciences Conformity General Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular Biology 03 medical and health sciences Social Conformity Animals Learning Social Behavior education Sociocultural evolution Selection (genetic algorithm) 030304 developmental biology media_common 0303 health sciences education.field_of_study Natural selection Models Genetic General Immunology and Microbiology Social learning Ecology Applied Mathematics Stochastic game General Medicine Gene-culture coevolution Biological Evolution Modeling and Simulation General Agricultural and Biological Sciences Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Theoretical Biology Journal of Theoretical Biology, Elsevier, 2009, 260 (2), pp.210. ⟨10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.05.029⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0022-5193 1095-8541 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.05.029 |
| Popis: | International audience; Humans and other animals do not use social learning indiscriminately, rather, natural selection has favoured the evolution of social learning rules that make selective use of social learning to acquire relevant information in a changing environment. We present a gene-culture coevolutionary analysis of a small selection of such rules (unbiased social learning, payoff-biased social learning and frequency-dependent biased social learning, including conformism and anti-conformism) in a population of asocial learners where the environment is subject to a constant probability of change to a novel state. We define conditions under which each rule evolves to a genetically-polymorphic equilibrium. We find that payoff-biased social learning may evolve under high levels of environmental variation if the fitness benefit associated with the acquired behaviour is either high or low but not of intermediate value. In contrast, both conformist and anti-conformist biases can become fixed when environment variation is low, whereupon the mean fitness in the population is higher than for a population of asocial learners. Our examination of the population dynamics reveals stable limit cycles under conformist and anti-conformist biases and some highly complex dynamics including chaos. Anti-conformists can out-compete conformists when conditions favour a low equilibrum frequency of the learned behaviour. We conclude that evolution, punctuated by the repeated successful invasion of different social learning rules, should continuously favour a reduction in the equilibrium frequency of asocial learning, and propose that, among competing social learning rules, the dominant rule will be the one that can persist with the lowest frequency of asocial learning. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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