No Such Thing as a Small Leak: Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Symmetric Searchable Encryption

Autor: Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako, Pascal Lafourcade, Matthieu Giraud, Olivier Bernard
Přispěvatelé: THALES COMMUNICATIONS & SECURITY, THALES [France], Laboratoire d'Informatique, de Modélisation et d'Optimisation des Systèmes (LIMOS), Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de St Etienne (ENSM ST-ETIENNE)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)-Institut national polytechnique Clermont Auvergne (INP Clermont Auvergne), Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)-Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA), ANR-16-IDEX-0001,CAP 20-25,CAP 20-25(2016), THALES, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de St Etienne-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)-Institut national polytechnique Clermont Auvergne (INP Clermont Auvergne), Lafourcade, Pascal, CAP 20-25 - - CAP 20-252016 - ANR-16-IDEX-0001 - IDEX - VALID
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: Communications in Computer and Information Science
Communications in Computer and Information Science, 2019, E-Business and Telecommunications 14th International Joint Conference, ICETE 2017, Madrid, Spain, July 24-26, 2017, Revised Selected Paper, 990, pp.253-277
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer Verlag, 2019, E-Business and Telecommunications 14th International Joint Conference, ICETE 2017, Madrid, Spain, July 24-26, 2017, Revised Selected Paper, 990, pp.253-277
E-Business and Telecommunications ISBN: 9783030110383
ICETE (Selected Papers)
ISSN: 1865-0929
Popis: Symmetric Searchable Encryption (\(\mathrm {SSE}\)) schemes enable clients to securely outsource their data while maintaining the ability to perform keywords search over it. The security of these schemes is based on an explicit leakage profile [1], has initiated the investigation into how much information could be deduced in practice from this leakage. In this paper, after recalling the leakage hierarchy introduced in 2015 by Cash et al. and the passive attacks of [1] on \(\mathrm {SSE}\) schemes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks on a wider set of real-world datasets than previously shown. On the other hand, we show that the attacks are inefficient against some types of datasets. Finally, we used what we learned from the unsuccessful datasets to give insight into future countermeasures.
Databáze: OpenAIRE