Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market
| Autor: | John H. Goddeeris, John R. Wolfe |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1991 |
| Předmět: |
Male
Insurance Selection Bias Moral hazard Cost-Benefit Analysis Adverse selection Morals Morale hazard Medigap Health care Economics Humans Least-Squares Analysis Aged Health Services Needs and Demand Actuarial science business.industry Health Policy Public Health Environmental and Occupational Health Insurance Medigap Group insurance United States Socioeconomic Factors Wealth effect Income Female Health Expenditures business Models Econometric |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Health Economics. 10:433-459 |
| ISSN: | 0167-6296 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/0167-6296(91)90024-h |
| Popis: | Using data from a longitudinal study of the recently retired we attempt to separate the moral hazard effect of Medicare supplementary (Medigap) insurance on health care expenditures from the adverse selection effect of poor health on Medigap coverage. We find evidence of adverse selection, but its magnitude is unlikely to create serious efficiency problems. Taking adverse selection into account reduces the estimate of the moral hazard effect. In addition, we find a strong positive wealth effect on the demand for supplementary insurance. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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