An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems
| Autor: | Eric J. Friedman, Ian A. Kash, Joseph Y. Halpern |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Marketing Statistics and Probability Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Scrip Work (thermodynamics) Kullback–Leibler divergence Distribution (number theory) Monotonic function Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Computational Mathematics Strategy Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Currency Computer Science (miscellaneous) Economics Mathematical economics Game theory Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 3:1-32 |
| ISSN: | 2167-8383 2167-8375 |
| Popis: | A game-theoretic model of scrip (artificial currency) systems is analyzed. It is shown that relative entropy can be used to characterize the distribution of agent wealth when all agents use threshold strategies---that is, they volunteer to do work iff they have below a threshold amount of money. Monotonicity of agents' best-reply functions is used to show that scrip systems have pure strategy equilibria where all agents use threshold strategies. An algorithm is given that can compute such an equilibrium and the resulting distribution of wealth. 32 pages. Forthcoming in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Preliminary versions of this material appeared in the Proceedings of the 7th and 8th ACM Conferences on Electronic Commerce [14, 26] and the Proceedings of the First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications [27]. These are also available as arXiv:0705.4094, arXiv:0705.4110, and arXiv:0903.2278 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|