The procedural egalitarian solution
| Autor: | Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, Bas Dietzenbacher |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Center Ph. D. Students, Research Group: Operations Research, Econometrics and Operations Research |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Class (set theory) 021103 operations research Computer science 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING 02 engineering and technology Cooperative Games egalitarian procedure procedural egalitarian solution c71 - Cooperative Games 0502 economics and business Economics egalitarian stability constrained equal awards rule egalitarianism 050207 economics Transferable utility Mathematical economics Finance Egalitarianism |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior, 106, 179-187. Elsevier Science Games and Economic Behavior, 106, 179-187. Academic Press Inc. |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect