A positive analysis of deposit insurance provision: Regulatory competition among European Union countries
| Autor: | Merwan H. Engineer, Paul Schure, Mark Gillis |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Fixed deposit
Economic policy Economics Econometrics and Finance(all) 0502 economics and business Economics media_common.cataloged_instance European Union 050207 economics European union media_common Regulatory competition 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences Deposit insurance International economics General insurance Certificate of deposit Banking Key person insurance Financial regulation Retail banking business General Economics Econometrics and Finance Finance |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Stability. 9:530-544 |
| ISSN: | 1572-3089 |
| Popis: | We consider the provision of deposit insurance as the outcome of a non-cooperative policy game between nations. Nations compete for deposits in order to protect their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight. Policies are chosen to attract depositors who optimally respond to the expected return to deposits, which depends on deposit insurance levels, systemic risk and transaction costs. We identify both defensive and beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The model sheds light on the European banking crisis of 2008 in which individual nations ratcheted up their deposit insurance levels. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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