Managerial entrenchment and earnings management
| Autor: | Jordi Surroca, Juan Manuel García Lara, Fabrizio Di Meo |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Research programme I&O, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Comunidad de Madrid |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Sociology and Political Science
Accrual Accounting Economía G3 FIRM VALUE Shareholder Earnings management PRIVATE INFORMATION M4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 0502 economics and business DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS Private information retrieval EXPECTATIONS 050208 finance Earnings business.industry Corporate governance 05 social sciences Enterprise value 050201 accounting PERFORMANCE Managerial entrenchment REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION Incentive MARKET business TAKEOVER PROTECTION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE Empresa |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(5), 399-414. ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid instname |
| Popis: | Agency theorists have long contended that managerial entrenchment is detrimental for shareholders, because it protects managers from the discipline of corporate governance. However, as a competing hypothesis, we argue that entrenchment can also provide benefits for the firm’s owners: it leads managers to be less myopic in managing earnings to meet short-term financial reporting goals. Our findings are consistent with this prediction as they suggest that, when there are incentives to manipulate firms’ performance, entrenched managers are less prone to engage in earnings management activities that hurt shareholders. Specifically, we focus on firms that just meet or marginally beat earnings benchmarks and document a negative association between managerial entrenchment and both the opportunistic use of accruals and the manipulation of real activities. We also show that earnings management is less detrimental to firm value if the manager is entrenched. Finally, we find that these effects of entrenchment on earnings management are only present for firms domiciled in Delaware. We acknowledge financial contribution from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, grants ECO2016-77579 and ECO2013-48328, Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, grant ECO2012-34734, and from the CAM-UC3M, grant CCG10-UC3M/HUM-4760 and H2015/HUM-3417, INNCOMCON-CM |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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