Indirect punishment and generosity toward strangers
| Autor: | Aljaž Ule, Arno Riedl, Timothy N. Cason, Arthur Schram |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC, Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB) |
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
Generosity
Reciprocity (social and political philosophy) Punishment (psychology) Kindness media_common.quotation_subject Altruism 03 medical and health sciences Interpersonal relationship Punishment Reward 0502 economics and business Economics Humans 050207 economics Cooperative Behavior Social Behavior 030304 developmental biology media_common 0303 health sciences Multidisciplinary 05 social sciences Social relation Games Experimental Prosocial behavior Social psychology |
| Zdroj: | Science, 326(5960), 1701-1704. American Association for the Advancement of Science |
| ISSN: | 1095-9203 0036-8075 |
| Popis: | Cheaper Cooperation In the context of public goods games in which optimal benefit is achieved when all participants contribute, bad behavior cannot always be deterred by direct punishment, and has the added disadvantage that the punisher may suffer a cost. Alternatively, instead of punishment, rewarding those who contribute can be effective in encouraging and maintaining widespread cooperation, with the added plus that group benefits are not diminished by the costs of punishment. But Ule et al. (p. 1701 ) discovered experimentally that if someone is treated depending on how they have behaved in previous interactions, retaining the option to occasionally apply punishment shifts the payouts to favor cooperators more than defectors. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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