Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
| Autor: | Jens Gudmundsson |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
Compromises Economics and Econometrics Matching (statistics) 05 social sciences Probabilistic logic Stability (learning theory) Lottery 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine Mathematics (miscellaneous) Two-sided matching 0502 economics and business Non-manipulability 050206 economic theory 030212 general & internal medicine Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Set (psychology) Stability Mathematical economics Rewards Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Gudmundsson, J 2019, ' Compromises and Rewards : stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 365-392 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1 |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 0020-7276 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1 |
| Popis: | Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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