Industry Tournament Incentives
| Autor: | Jeffrey L. Coles, Albert Y Wang, Zhichuan Li |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Labour economics 050208 finance ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Finance and Financial Management Compensation (psychology) 05 social sciences ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Corporate Finance Investment (macroeconomics) GeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUS Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Firm risk Incentive Accounting 0502 economics and business Tournament Business 050207 economics Finance |
| Zdroj: | Business Publications |
| ISSN: | 1465-7368 0893-9454 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/rfs/hhx064 |
| Popis: | We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar (industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive winning. Received October 21, 2012; editorial decision March 26, 2017 by Editor Laura Starks. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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