Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field
| Autor: | Cynthia Kinnan, Horacio Larreguy, Arun G. Chandrasekhar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
jel:Z13
Public economics business.industry Social proximity 05 social sciences Public relations 16. Peace & justice jel:D03 jel:D14 Income distribution 0502 economics and business Economic anthropology jel:O16 050207 economics Centrality business Enforcement General Economics Econometrics and Finance 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 10:43-78 |
| ISSN: | 1945-7790 1945-7782 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/app.20150057 |
| Popis: | Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects’ partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners’ relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. While socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement, distant pairs do not. Individuals with more central partners behave more cooperatively without enforcement. Capacity for cooperation in the absence of contract enforcement therefore depends on the subjects’ network position. (JEL C93, D86, K12, O15, O17, Z13) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|