Interlocking directorships and patenting coordination
| Autor: | Michele Bernini, Antonio Navas, Georgios Efthyvoulou, Ian Gregory-Smith, Jolian McHardy |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Engineering
business.industry jel:D85 05 social sciences jel:G30 patents director networks knowledge spillovers patent coordination jel:O31 Patent portfolio Property rights Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business jel:O32 jel:J49 Operations management 050207 economics Interlock business General Economics Econometrics and Finance 050203 business & management Interlocking Industrial organization |
| Zdroj: | Economics of Innovation and New Technology. 30:382-411 |
| ISSN: | 1476-8364 1043-8599 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/10438599.2019.1710026 |
| Popis: | The aim of this paper is to investigate the role interlocking directorships play in the patenting activities of UK companies and provide further insights into the channels through which this relationship emerges. Our empirical analysis produces three main results: first, interlocking leads to a higher number of successful patent applications; second, interlocked firms are more likely to cite each other's patents, especially around the moment of interlocking; and, third, interlocked companies tend to increase the technological similarity of their patent portfolio in the immediate period following their first interlock. To rationalise these results, we develop a theoretical model that identifies interlocking directorships as a practice that prevents property right conflicts that often arise between firms that are technologically close to each other. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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