Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains With Multiple Fairness-Concerned Collectors
| Autor: | Zu-Jun Ma, Yadong Shu, Ying Dai |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
absolute fairness concern
0209 industrial biotechnology Pricing decision Profit (accounting) General Computer Science Supply chain Tariff Distribution (economics) relative fairness concern 02 engineering and technology Microeconomics peer-induced fairness concern 020901 industrial engineering & automation Closed-loop supply chain distributional fairness concern 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics General Materials Science Electrical and Electronic Engineering business.industry General Engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing two-part Tariff contract lcsh:Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering business Closed loop lcsh:TK1-9971 |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Access, Vol 8, Pp 151335-151349 (2020) |
| ISSN: | 2169-3536 |
| Popis: | In the same model, both distributional fairness concern and peer-induced fairness concern are considered, so are the absolute fairness concern and the relative fairness concern. When there are multiple recycling markets, collectors attach importance not only to the fairness distribution of profit with the manufacturer (distributional fairness concern), but also to the fairness distribution of profit with the peer collector (peer-induced fairness concern). On the basis of the perspective of the collectors, this article introduces distributional and peer-induced fairness concern into the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The impact of the collectors' different fairness concerns on the CLSC pricing decisions is discussed under five models.The research shows that: (1) When the manufacturer considers the collectors' fairness concern, the manufacturer's profit and distributional fairness concern coefficient change inversely, and the collectors' profit and distributional fairness concern coefficient move together, that is, the distributional fairness concern is of advantage to the collectors but not good for the manufacturer. On the contrary, the manufacturer's profit and peer-induced fairness concern coefficient move in the same direction, while the profit of the collectors and peer-induced fairness concern coefficient change in opposite direction; (2) As long as the manufacturer considers the fairness of the collectors, the profit of the collector who pays attention to both fairness is always lower than that of the collector who only concerns distributional fairness, so peer-induced fairness concern is not a self-interest behavior. However, when the appeal of the two collectors for fairness distribution is not considered by the manufacturer, peer-induced fairness concern benefits himself; (3) The two-part Tariff contract has realized the coordination of the CLSC. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the collectors consider multiple fairness concerns. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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