A differential environmental game with coupling constraints
| Autor: | Georges Zaccour, Mabel Tidball |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Montréal |
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
0106 biological sciences
Mathematical optimization Control and Optimization Computer science 0211 other engineering and technologies Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology MARKETS 01 natural sciences TAXATION MECHANISM [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Differential game NASH-COURNOT EQUILIBRIA ROSEN EQUILIBRIUM ENVIRONMENT Non-cooperative game 021103 operations research DIFFERENTIAL GAMES Applied Mathematics Differential (mechanical device) 010601 ecology Constraint (information theory) Coupling (computer programming) Terminal (electronics) Control and Systems Engineering Mathematical economics Software |
| Zdroj: | Optimal Control Applications and Methods Optimal Control Applications and Methods, Wiley, 2009, 30 (2), pp.197-207. ⟨10.1002/oca.849⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1099-1514 0143-2087 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/oca.849 |
| Popis: | We consider a finite-horizon two-player differential game where the players face a common terminal environmental constraint. Our aim is to verify whether the result obtained in a static context, namely, that the Pareto-optimal cooperative solution can be attained as a normalized noncooperative Rosen equilibrium, can be generalized to a dynamic setting. We show that this is not the case. However, we provide a taxation mechanism of players' emissions that forces them to implement the less-polluting cooperative strategies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Plný text