Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective
| Autor: | Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University College of London [London] (UCL) |
| Rok vydání: | 2008 |
| Předmět: |
Principal-agent
Information acquisition Economics and Econometrics Strategy and Management Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Principal–agent problem Computer security computer.software_genre 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics Competence (human resources) Private information retrieval 050205 econometrics Actuarial science 05 social sciences [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 16. Peace & justice Incentive JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory Industrial relations Screening JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games Know-how computer |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Industrial Organization International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2008, 26 (1), pp.206-212. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002 |
| Popis: | A principal has to choose among several agents to fulfill a task and then provide the right incentives to perform it. Agents do not a priori know how competent they are for the task. It is shown that the principal should propose a contract that leads the agents to gather information about their competence prior to signing the contract. This insight is in sharp contrast with Cremer and Khalil [J. Cremer, F. Khalil: "Gathering information before signing a contract", American Economic Review, 82, 1992, 566-578] who consider a setup with one agent (or alternatively a setup with several agents in which the private information commonly applies to all agents). It emerges because, in our private value setup, information acquisition accompanied by a proper screening device increases the chance that the principal will pick a competent agent. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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