Trust and Trustworthiness in Corrupted Economic Environments
| Autor: | Vittorio Pelligra, Leonardo Becchetti, Luca Corazzini |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
Value (ethics) Corruption media_common.quotation_subject corruption Audit extended trust game lcsh:Technology Microeconomics lcsh:Social Sciences Dictator game Extended trust game Laboratory experiment 0502 economics and business ddc:330 Economics 050207 economics Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica 050205 econometrics media_common lcsh:T Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences laboratory experiment Reciprocity (evolution) lcsh:H Trustworthiness Statistics Probability and Uncertainty |
| Zdroj: | Games, Vol 12, Iss 16, p 16 (2021) Games Volume 12 Issue 1 |
| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |
| Popis: | We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find a slightly higher trustor’s giving in the presence of corruption, matched by a significant excess of reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect, on average, corruption to act as a tax, inelastic to changes in the probability of corruption prosecution. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes in history, where examples of commendable giving have been used to stimulate emulation of ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes the trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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