Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism
| Autor: | Christopher Duquette, Franklin Mixon, Richard J. Cebula |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Electoral College
voting power Presidential system Spoilt vote Presidential election 05 social sciences jel:D72 ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING jel:D12 jel:D78 Hardware_PERFORMANCEANDRELIABILITY Public administration 0506 political science jel:K00 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Fiscal federalism Electoral college 050207 economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance First-past-the-post voting Administration (government) Two-round system Hardware_LOGICDESIGN |
| Zdroj: | Atlantic Economic Journal. 45:45-57 |
| ISSN: | 1573-9678 0197-4254 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11293-016-9526-2 |
| Popis: | There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American politics. While some argue that swing voters either do not swing or have a marginal impact on campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise of independents means that they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable commodity to candidates. Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters. A robust literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other states. This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection process. Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states. But these assertions notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some states compared to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be quantified? Relatedly, does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters? This study presents a new method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method that states use to allocate electoral votes. By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, we quantify how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in the voting power of citizens across states. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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