Avoiding risk and avoiding evidence
| Autor: | Catrin Campbell-Moore, Bernhard Salow |
|---|---|
| Předmět: |
Ideal (set theory)
accuracy 05 social sciences risk aversion Risk aversion (psychology) Centre for Science and Philosophy 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology value of information Value of information Philosophy 060302 philosophy Economics 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences epistemic utility theory Positive economics |
| Zdroj: | Campbell-Moore, C & Salow, B 2020, ' Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 98, no. 3, pp. 495-515 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305 |
| ISSN: | 1471-6828 0004-8402 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305 |
| Popis: | It is natural to think that there's something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic utility, or accuracy, when considering risk-avoidant agents. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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