Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scottish Fishing Vessel Decommissioning Program
| Autor: | Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, Steven Schilizzi |
|---|---|
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Fishing TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Environmental Science (miscellaneous) Experimental economics Nuclear decommissioning Ecosystem services Microeconomics Bid shading Economics Common value auction Natural resource management Auctions procurement tenders conservation fisheries buyback schemes decommissioning natural resource management evaluation experimental economics Agribusiness C92 D44 Q22 Q28 Agribusiness |
| Zdroj: | University of Western Australia |
| Popis: | As an alternative to the more traditional fixed-price schemes, governments can run auctions to purchase environmental services from private agents. Governments have so far chosen the discriminatory price (DP) over the uniform price (UP) format. Theoretical and experimental studies have concluded that the DP usually performs better than the UP in terms of cost-effectiveness. Using field data from two fishing vessel decommissioning auctions in Scotland, we find ambiguous results regarding relative DP and UP performances. A novel approach for estimating the underlying bidder costs shows that bid shading and cost heterogeneity can each determine relative auction performance. (JEL Q22, Q28) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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