A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion
| Autor: | Michel Mougeot, Sonia Schwartz |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC ( CRESE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - Clermont Auvergne ( CERDI ), Université Clermont Auvergne ( UCA ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) (CRESE), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC), Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] (UCA [2017-2020])-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) (CRESE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Marginal cost
Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Optimal mechanism Price discrimination [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Payment Microeconomics Traffic congestion Willingness to pay 0502 economics and business Economics [ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances Revenue 050207 economics Marginal utility ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | German Economic Review German Economic Review, Wiley, 2018, 19 (2), pp.190-208. 〈10.1111/geer.12124〉 German Economic Review, Wiley, 2018, 19 (2), pp.190-208. ⟨10.1111/geer.12124⟩ German Economic Review, 2018, 19 (2), pp.190-208. ⟨10.1111/geer.12124⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1468-0475 1465-6485 |
| Popis: | In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a seconddegree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second-degree price discrimination and from a third-degree price discrimination and high willingness-to-pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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