Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices
Autor: | Mehmet Ekmekci, Alp E. Atakan |
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Přispěvatelé: | Atakan, Alp Enver (ORCID 0000-0003-3640-187X & YÖK ID 39383), Ekmekçi, Mehmet, College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Department of Economics |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Generalized second-price auction Auction theory 05 social sciences Dutch auction Auctions Large markets Information aggregation Economics Mathematics Social sciences Mathematical methods Statistics and probability Revenue equivalence Microeconomics Reverse auction 0502 economics and business Vickrey auction Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Business 050207 economics English auction 050205 econometrics |
Zdroj: | Econometrica |
ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
DOI: | 10.3982/ecta14935 |
Popis: | We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object-to-bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders. European Research Council (ERC) |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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