Incidence of Bank Levy and Bank Market Power
| Autor: | Gunther Capelle-Blancard, Olena Havrylchyk |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Business (PSB), Labex ReFi, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII), HESAM Université - Communauté d'universités et d'établissements Hautes écoles Sorbonne Arts et métiers université (HESAM) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets bank levy Bank tax Monetary economics jel:H22 jel:G21 banks Tax rate Oligopoly JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages Accounting 0502 economics and business Economics Balance sheet Market power tax incidence market power 050207 economics Tax incidence Price elasticity of demand 050208 finance JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation Subsidies and Revenue/H.H2.H22 - Incidence 05 social sciences [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Shock (economics) jel:L13 Finance |
| Zdroj: | Review of Finance Review of Finance, Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F-Oxford Open Option D, 2017, 21 (3), pp.1023-1046. ⟨10.1093/rof/rfw069⟩ Review of Finance, 2017, 21 (3), pp.1023-1046. ⟨10.1093/rof/rfw069⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1572-3097 1573-692X |
| DOI: | 10.1093/rof/rfw069⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; This is the first analysis of the incidence of a bank tax that is imposed on banks’ balance sheets. Within the framework of an oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model, the pass-through of a bank tax levied on loans is stronger when elasticity of credit demand is low. To test this hypothesis, we investigate the incidence of the Hungarian bank tax that was introduced in 2010 on banks’ assets. This case is well suited for our analysis because the tax rate is much higher for large banks than for small banks, which allows relying on difference-in-difference methodology to disentangle the impact of the tax from any other shock that might have occurred simultaneously. In line with model predictions, our estimations show that the tax is shifted to customers with the smallest demand elasticity, such as households. In terms of economic policy implications, our results suggest that enhanced borrower mobility could reduce the ability of banks to shift taxes to customers. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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