| Autor: |
Mücke, Christian, Pelizzon, Loriana, Pezone, Vincenzo, Thakor, Anjan V. |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2021 |
| Předmět: |
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| Popis: |
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury - helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments - the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay, and higher stock market valuations. Thursday 16th September, 2021 |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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