Getting a grasp on action-specific scaling: A response to Witt (2017)
| Autor: | Rebecca Lawson, Elizabeth S. Collier |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
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Experimental and Cognitive Psychology Article 050105 experimental psychology 03 medical and health sciences Cognition 0302 clinical medicine Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) Vision. Action-specific perception. Grasping. Action capacity Perception Developmental and Educational Psychology Humans 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Empirical evidence media_common Hand Strength 05 social sciences Morality Object (philosophy) Variation (linguistics) Action (philosophy) Space Perception Visual Perception Size Perception Psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW Psychonomic Bulletin & Review |
| ISSN: | 1531-5320 1069-9384 |
| DOI: | 10.3758/s13423-018-1511-0 |
| Popis: | Can higher level cognition directly influence visual spatial perception? Many recent studies have claimed so, on the basis that manipulating cognitive factors (e.g., morality, emotion, action capacity) seems to directly affect perception. However, Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016) argued that such studies often fall prey to at least one of six pitfalls. They further argued that if an effect could be accounted for by any of these pitfalls, it is not a true demonstration of a top-down influence of cognition on perception. In response to Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016), Witt (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(4), 999–1021, 2017) discussed four action-specific scaling effects which, she argued, withstand all six pitfalls and thus demonstrate true perceptual changes caused by differences in action capacity. Her third case study was the influence of apparent grasping capacity on perceived object size. In this article, we provide new interpretations of previous findings and assess recent data which suggest that this effect is not, in fact, perceptual. Instead, we believe that many earlier studies showing this effect are subject to one or more of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016). We substantiate our claims with recent empirical evidence from our laboratory which suggests that neither actual nor perceived grasping capacity directly influence perceived object size. We conclude that studies manipulating grasping capacity do not provide evidence for the action-specific account because variation in this factor does not directly influence size perception. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.3758/s13423-018-1511-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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