Does domain name encryption increase users' privacy?
| Autor: | Ricardo Morla, Francesca Soro, Martino Trevisan, Idilio Drago, Marco Mellia |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Trevisan, Martino, Soro, Francesca, Mellia, Marco, Drago, Idilio, Morla, Ricardo |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Networks and Communications
Network packet Computer science business.industry DNS 020206 networking & telecommunications 02 engineering and technology 16. Peace & justice Computer security computer.software_genre Encryption Privacy encryption Domain (software engineering) Privacy encryption DNS 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Key (cryptography) Server Name Indication 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business computer Software |
| Zdroj: | ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) instacron:RCAAP |
| Popis: | Knowing domain names associated with traffic allows eavesdroppers to profile users without accessing packet payloads. Encrypting domain names transiting the network is, therefore, a key step to increase network confidentiality. Latest efforts include encrypting the TLS Server Name Indication (eSNI extension) and encrypting DNS traffic, with DNS over HTTPS (DoH) representing a prominent proposal. In this paper, we show that an attacker able to observe users' traffic relying on plain-text DNS can uncover the domain names of users relying on eSNI or DoH. By relying on large-scale network traces, we show that simplistic features and off-the-shelf machine learning models are sufficient to achieve surprisingly high precision and recall when recovering encrypted domain names. The triviality of the attack calls for further actions to protect privacy, in particular considering transient scenarios in which only a fraction of users will adopt these new privacy-enhancing technologies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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