Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model

Autor:	Eric Fesselmeyer, Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	Statistics and Probability jel:D81 0209 industrial biotechnology Economics and Econometrics Sequential game 02 engineering and technology Microeconomics jel:O40 020901 industrial engineering & automation Capital accumulation 0502 economics and business Economics 050205 econometrics Consumption (economics) jel:D92 Capital accumulation dynamic game growth investment technical progress Applied Mathematics jel:C72 05 social sciences jel:C73 Investment (macroeconomics) Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design Social planner Computer Science Applications Technical progress Computational Mathematics Computational Theory and Mathematics Capital (economics) Capital accumulation Dynamic game Growth Investment Non-excludable capital Externality
Zdroj:	Dynamic Games and Applications. 6:209-224
ISSN:	2153-0793 2153-0785
DOI:	10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6
Popis:	We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e1bec42e210600265fe164f076b3aed3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink