Strategic Transmission of Correlated Information

Autor:	A.K.S. Chand, Giovanni Ursino, Sergio Currarini
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Correlation across Signals Economics and Econometrics Transmission (telecommunications) 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Electronic engineering TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Business Cheap Talk 050207 economics Multiple Players Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA 050205 econometrics
Zdroj:	The Economic Journal. 130:2175-2206
ISSN:	1468-0297 0013-0133
DOI:	10.1093/ej/ueaa039
Popis:	We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully can be non-monotonic: while little and large levels of correlation hinder truth-telling, intermediate levels may discipline experts’ equilibrium behaviour and foster truthful communication. We discuss the implications of our results for the political discussion in the presence of ‘selective exposure' to media, where similarity in preferences comes with higher correlation, and a trade-off between truth-telling incentives and informational content arises.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0b6e379eb2ae4c5bcd153f9d6304170 https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa039 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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