The Use of Adjusted Earnings in Performance Evaluation
| Autor: | Asher Curtis, Paige Harrington Patrick, Valerie Li |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Earnings response coefficient
Executive compensation Earnings Earnings per share business.industry education Sample (statistics) Accounting General Business Management and Accounting Compensation (engineering) Corporate finance Incentive Power over Shareholder Price–earnings ratio Econometrics Incentive alignment Demographic economics Business health care economics and organizations Public finance |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2682652 |
| Popis: | We document widespread adoption of adjustments to earnings for performance evaluation; 84% of our sample of S&P 1500 firms use adjusted earnings for bonus compensation. We find that the transactions removed from adjusted earnings vary widely and include both transitory and nontransitory items. We examine the determinants of using adjusted earnings and find some evidence that boards are more likely to contract using adjusted earnings when firms have high levels of intangible assets, more volatile earnings, CEOs with shorter tenures, CEOs who also act as board chairperson, or larger compensation committees or are reporting losses. We find that firms with an independent chairperson or lead director are less likely to contract using adjusted earnings. We examine the compensation consequences of the use of adjusted earnings and find that CEOs compensated on adjusted earnings are less likely to miss minimum bonus thresholds, are less likely to meet maximum bonus thresholds, and have higher overall bonus compensation, controlling for firm performance. Taken together, our analyses suggest that both managerial power and efficient contracting concerns explain the use of adjusted earnings in CEO compensation contracts. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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