Team incentives, task assignment, and performance: A field experiment
| Autor: | Michiel Souverijn, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Economics |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
050208 finance Sociology and Political Science 05 social sciences Task (project management) Incentive 0502 economics and business Incentive program Seniority Business Work teams 050207 economics Business and International Management Marketing Applied Psychology |
| Zdroj: | The Leadership Quarterly, 31(3):101241. Elsevier Inc. |
| ISSN: | 1048-9843 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.03.003 |
| Popis: | The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations often play a role as well. Team incentives have the potential to curtail the role of these factors in favor of performance — in particular when the incentive plan includes both the leader and the team members. This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to study the effects of such team incentives on task assignment and performance. We introduce team incentives in a random subsets of 108 stores of a Dutch retail chain. We find no effect of the incentive, neither on task assignment nor on performance. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect