Stackelberg Independence*
| Autor: | Toomas Hinnosaar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Economics and Econometrics General Economics (econ.GN) Stackelberg leadership model General Business Management and Accounting FOS: Economics and business oligopolies Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Accounting Economics - Theoretical Economics Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) sequential games Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) Economics - General Economics |
| Zdroj: | The Journal of Industrial Economics. 69:214-238 |
| ISSN: | 1467-6451 0022-1821 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/joie.12244 |
| Popis: | The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders' actions are informative about market conditions and independent of lead-ers' beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders' choices completely uninformative. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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