An Ultimatum Game with Multidimensional Response Strategies
| Autor: | Ivan Soraperra, Chiara Nardi, M. Vittoria Levati, Werner Güth |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Community and Home Care
Ultimatum Social preferences Incomplete information Experiments jel:C91 Ultimatum game jel:D63 jel:D74 jel:C72 Social preferences Outcome (game theory) Preference Ultimatum Incomplete information Experiments Task (project management) Complete information Behavioral decision making Economics Social psychology |
| Zdroj: | Review of Behavioral Economics |
| ISSN: | 2326-6201 2326-6198 |
| Popis: | We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome- based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer's demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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