The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance

Autor:	Joshua Graff Zivin, Elizabeth Lyons
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Scheme (programming language) 050208 finance 05 social sciences Total compensation General Medicine Compensation (engineering) Microeconomics Incentive General partnership 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics computer computer.programming_language
Zdroj:	AEA Papers and Proceedings. 111:577-581
ISSN:	2574-0776 2574-0768
Popis:	Author(s): Zivin, Joshua Graff; Lyons, Elizabeth | Abstract: Successful innovation is essential for the survival and growth of organizations, but how best to incentivize innovation is poorly understood. We compare how two common incentive schemes affect innovative performance in a field experiment run in partnership with a large life sciences company. We find that a winner-takes-all compensation scheme generates significantly more novel innovation relative to a compensation scheme that offers the same total compensation but shares it across the ten best innovations. Moreover, the winner-takes-all scheme does not reduce innovative output on average and, among teams of innovators, generates more output than the less risky prize structure.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dad603644bde2101008553f1286e7ff3 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20211119 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF