On the benefits of contractual inefficiency in quality-differentiated markets
| Autor: | Olivier Bonroy, Emanuele Bacchiega |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna (UNIBO), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF), Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Marginal cost
Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Supply chain vertical product differentiation [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio] VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION VERTICAL INTEGRATION LINEAR TARIFF TWO-PART TARIFF CONSUMER SURPLUS finiteness property consumer surplus linear tariff Vertical integration vertical integration Microeconomics jel:L22 Market structure 0502 economics and business Quality (business) 050207 economics Industrial organization ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 050205 econometrics media_common VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS 05 social sciences contract inefficiency Economic surplus [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance two-part tariff jel:L4 jel:L13 Business Inefficiency Two-part tariff |
| Zdroj: | Workshop ANR : "Competition and bargaining in vertical chains" Workshop ANR : "Competition and bargaining in vertical chains", Jun 2014, Rennes, France Oxford Economic Papers Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015, 67 (3), pp.846-863. ⟨10.1093/oep/gpv005⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0030-7653 1464-3812 |
| Popis: | Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an input price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality- differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual efficiency in high-quality supply chains may adversely affect the market structure by driving low-quality vertical chains out of the market and consequently reduce consumer surplus. Due to the finiteness property, (counter-)integration in the low-quality channel does not allow this channel to be in business. Our result holds irrespective of whether the contractual inefficiencies originate from the double marginalization or the ‘commitment effect’. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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