Bundling, à la carte pricing and vertical bargaining in a two-sided model
| Autor: | Adam D. Rennhoff, Minghua Chen, Konstantinos Serfes |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Upstream (petroleum industry)
Economics and Econometrics 05 social sciences Management Monitoring Policy and Law Two-sided market Economic surplus Profit (economics) Microeconomics Incentive Downstream (manufacturing) Bundle 0502 economics and business Economics Business Market model 050207 economics License Industrial organization 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Information Economics and Policy. 35:30-44 |
| ISSN: | 0167-6245 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.03.001 |
| Popis: | a b s t r a c t We develop a two-sided market model with an upstream-downstream structure. More specifically, the platform consists of two rival upstream firms and a downstream monopo- list. Each upstream firm negotiates the input price (license fee) with the downstream mo- nopolist and also chooses the amount of advertising that is embedded in the good it sells to the downstream monopolist. The downstream monopolist can offer the two goods ei- ther on an al a carte basis or as a bundle. We use this model to understand the incentives to bundle and the welfare properties of bundling in a two-sided market framework. We also contribute to the ongoing debate on al a carte pricing in the TV industry, where the two upstream firms can be viewed as two rival TV networks and the downstream monop- olist as a cable operator. We show that an al a carte regulation will raise consumer surplus and downstream profit, while it will decrease the profits of the upstream TV networks. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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