When less is more: The benefits of limits on executive pay
| Autor: | Benjamin E. Hermalin, Peter Cebon |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Finance
Economics and Econometrics Executive compensation business.industry Moral hazard Corporate governance Compensation (psychology) Accounting ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Ideal (ethics) Banking Business economics Principal (commercial law) Shareholder Applied Economics Economics Finance and Investment business Economic Theory |
| Zdroj: | Cebon, P; & Hermalin, BE. (2015). When less is more: The benefits of limits on executive pay. Review of Financial Studies, 28(6), 1667-1700. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhu140. UC Berkeley: Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z54n89p Review of Financial Studies, vol 28, iss 6 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/rfs/hhu140. |
| Popis: | © The Author 2014. We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance-contingent contracts. This has implications for the ideal composition of the board. The analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive-compensation reform. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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