Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries
| Autor: | Leo Wangler, Hans-Peter Weikard, Andreas Freytag |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Coalition formation
Economics and Econometrics Minimum participation rules international environmental agreements coalition formation transboundary pollution environmental policy coordination Exploit jel:D62 media_common.quotation_subject Transboundary pollution jel:H41 WASS Management Monitoring Policy and Law jel:D02 Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Microeconomics Environmental policy coordination Economics media_common International environmental agreements jel:C72 Cartel Minimum participation rules Free riding Negotiation Bargaining power If and only if Free ride Milieueconomie en Natuurlijke Hulpbronnen |
| Zdroj: | Environmental and Resource Economics 62 (2015) 4 Environmental and Resource Economics, 62(4), 711-727 |
| ISSN: | 1573-1502 0924-6460 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10640-014-9861-1 |
| Popis: | Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyse a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements. While a full participation requirement would be efficient, we find (sequential) equilibria with a minimum participation rule that allows at least one country to free ride. Free riding may occur if a country can exploit some bargaining power in the negotiation of the minimum participation rule. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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