Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics
| Autor: | Max Kölbel |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
representation
Computer science centred content 05 social sciences Representation (systemics) David Lewis 06 humanities and the arts Frege-Geach Problem Nicholas Unwin 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy representational content 060302 philosophy content Mark Schroeder 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences metaethics Allan Gibbard Perspectival content |
| Zdroj: | University of Vienna-u:cris Normativity and the Problem of Representation ISBN: 9780429331169 |
| ISSN: | 1911-0820 0045-5091 |
| Popis: | The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations (thus doing justice to their representational aspects) while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more general conception of representational content is exemplified, e.g. by Lewis's ‘centred contents’ and Gibbard's framework of ‘contents of judgement’, thus it is not new. I shall start in §1 by introducing the more general framework of perspectival contents and then illustrate in §2 how awareness of it can help expose the fallaciousness of certain widely used forms of argumentation in metaethics. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|