On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies
| Autor: | Giorgio Negroni, Lidia Bagnoli |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Negroni, GIORGIO GIOVANNI, Bagnoli, Lidia |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
0301 basic medicine
Macroeconomics Economics and Econometrics jel:Z13 Population jel:D83 Distribution (economics) Outcome (game theory) Microeconomics 03 medical and health sciences Stochastically stable equilibrium Dictator game Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business Economics ddc:330 050207 economics Business and International Management education Coevolution evolution social norms stochastically stable equilibrium modern hunter-gatherer societies C78 education.field_of_study L14 Ultimatum game business.industry 05 social sciences jel:C78 Investment (macroeconomics) SECS-P/01 Economia politica 030104 developmental biology Investment decisions D83 evolution social norms stochastically stable equilibrium modern hunter-gatherer societies Quaderni - Working Paper DSE Property rights Homogeneous Z13 jel:L14 Norm (social) business |
| Zdroj: | Bagnoli, Lidia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2012) On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 39. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3907 |
| DOI: | 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3907 |
| Popis: | Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profi le is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments profi le is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the efficient investment pro le and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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