Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale
| Autor: | Marco Pagnozzi, Krista Jabs Saral |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Pagnozzi, Marco, Jabs Saral, Krista, Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II, Webster University Geneva (Webster), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), University of Naples Federico II = Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Generalized second-price auction Auction theory 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) TheoryofComputation_GENERAL [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Purchasing Revenue equivalence Microeconomics Competition (economics) Commerce Multiunit auction 0502 economics and business Value (economics) Economics Common value auction 050206 economic theory Business English auction 050207 economics Speculation ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS |
| Zdroj: | Experimental Economics Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩ Experimental Economics, 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1386-4157 1573-6938 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩ |
| Popis: | We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market, with one positive-value bidder, and either one or two speculators who may choose simultaneously whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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