Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
| Autor: | Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Property (philosophy) public goods jel:D62 jel:D71 Collective choice jel:H41 subgame perfect equilibrium Public good Outcome (game theory) Subgame perfect equilibrium gregarious preferences Public Goods Gregarious Preferences Subgame Perfect Implementation Economics Subgame perfect implementation Set (psychology) Mathematical economics Finite set Finance Béns públics Public goods Gregarious preferences |
| Zdroj: | Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname |
| Popis: | We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós, Carmen Beviá, Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón, Humberto Llavador, Bernardo Moreno, David Pérez-Castrillo, Socorro Puy, Joaquim Silvestre, Marc Vorsatz, and Ashel Wolinsky. The work of Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER and through project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2005-00454 and through the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). The work of Nicolò is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research through grant 2005137858 We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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