Competition and Coordination in a Two-Channel Supply Chain
Autor: | Elodie Adida, Amy David |
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Rok vydání: | 2015 |
Předmět: |
supply chain management
game theory Operations Research Supply chain management incentives and contracting Applied Mathematics Supply chain Business and Management Service management Management Science and Operations Research Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Competition (economics) Product (business) Commerce dual-channel Management of Technology and Innovation ComputerApplications_GENERAL Business Inefficiency Game theory Industrial organization Communication channel |
Zdroj: | David, A; & Adida, E. (2015). Competition and Coordination in a Two-Channel Supply Chain. Production and Operations Management, 24(8), 1358-1370. doi: 10.1111/poms.12327. UC Riverside: Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9338453n Production and Operations Management, vol 24, iss 8 |
ISSN: | 1059-1478 |
Popis: | © 2014 Production and Operations Management Society. We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two-channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single-channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single-channel supply chain do not coordinate the two-channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two-channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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