Ad auctions with data
| Autor: | Hu Fu, Mohammad Mahdian, Patrick R. Jordan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Uri Nadav |
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| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
business.industry Auction theory Computer science Share of voice Dutch auction Optimal mechanism Context (language use) Advertising Online advertising Holy Grail Microeconomics Revenue equivalence Reservation price Value (economics) Vickrey auction Revenue Common value auction English auction business |
| Zdroj: | INFOCOM Workshops Algorithmic Game Theory ISBN: 9783642339950 SAGT |
| Popis: | The holy grail of online advertising is to target users with ads matched to their needs with such precision that the users respond to the ads, thereby increasing both advertisers' and users' value. The current approach to this challenge utilizes information about the users: their gender, their location, the websites they have visited before, and so on. Incorporating this data in ad auctions poses an economic challenge: can this be done in a way that the auctioneer's revenue does not decrease at least on average? This is the problem we study in this paper. Our main result is that in Myerson's optimal mechanism, for a general model of data in auctions, additional data leads to additional expected revenue. In the context of ad auctions we show that for the simple and common mechanisms, namely second price auction with reserve prices, there are instances in which additional data decreases the expected revenue, but this decrease is by at most a small constant factor under a standard regularity assumption. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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