Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Autor:	Dakshina G. De Silva, Klenio Barbosa, Liyu Yang, Hisayuki Yoshimoto
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Revenue equivalence 050208 finance 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Revenue Monetary economics Business 050207 economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Treasury
Zdroj:	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14:394-419
ISSN:	1945-7685 1945-7669
DOI:	10.1257/mic.20200216
Popis:	This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers—the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank—to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond yield-rate measurements and participation behavior. (JEL D44, E63, G12, O16, P34)
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d1ae34c9cf74392a5f0f09d1855fde59 https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200216 Zobrazit plný text záznamu