Interbank Deposits and Market discipline: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Banks

Autor: Amine Tarazi, Tchudjane Kouassi, Isabelle Distinguin
Přispěvatelé: Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique (LAPE), Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations (GIO), Université de Limoges (UNILIM)-Université de Limoges (UNILIM)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2013
Předmět:
transition economics
Economics and Econometrics
050208 finance
G28 _________________________ _
transition economics JEL Classifications: G21
G21
G28 _________________________ _ [bank risk
market discipline
interbank deposits
transition economics JEL Classifications]
05 social sciences
Financial system
Market discipline
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Banking industry
Eastern european
Bank risk
Market economy
interbank deposits
JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages
0502 economics and business
Economics
Deposit insurance
market discipline
JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Business
050207 economics
bank risk
ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
Zdroj: Journal of Comparative Economics
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2013, 41 (2), pp.544-560. ⟨10.1016/j.jce.2012.07.005⟩
BASE-Bielefeld Academic Search Engine
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2013, 41 (2), pp.544-560. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.2119956⟩
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2012, In print. ⟨10.1016/j.jce.2012.07.005⟩
ISSN: 0147-5967
1095-7227
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2012.07.005⟩
Popis: International audience; There is a considerable debate on the role played by market discipline in the banking industry. Using data for 207 banks across 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper empirically analyzes the disciplining role of interbank deposits. We find that market discipline has been effective in Central and Eastern Europe since the implementation of explicit deposit insurance. However, several factors affect the strength of this discipline. State-owned banks are not disciplined probably because they benefit from implicit insurance. Institutional and legal factors, and resolution strategies adopted by countries during banking crises also impact bank risk and the effectiveness of market discipline. Our results indicate that stronger regulatory discipline reduces risk but also weakens market discipline. We are very grateful to two anonymous reviewers
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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