| Autor: |
Andrabi, Tahir, Das, Jishnu, Khwaja, Asim I., Ozyurt, Selcuk |
| Rok vydání: |
2022 |
| Předmět: |
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| DOI: |
10.25446/oxford.21107839 |
| Popis: |
We test for financial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country by experimentally allocating unconditional cash grants to either one (L) or to all (H) private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in H along with higher teacher wages. This differential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater financial saturation crowds-in quality investments. Higher social surplus in H, but greater private returns in L underscores the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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