Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion

Autor: Huw Dixon
Rok vydání: 2000
Předmět:
Zdroj: Scopus-Elsevier
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00117-7
Popis: An economy consists of many markets, each of which is a duopoly. Firms must earn normal-profits in the long-run if they have to survive. Normal-profits are interpreted as the long-run limit of average profits in the whole economy. We adopt an aspiration based model of firm behaviour, linking it to the economy with the requirement that in the long-run, the profit aspiration must be at least as great as normal-profits. We assume that the joint-profits can be maximized with symmetric payoffs, and with very few other assumptions are able to show that the (almost) global attractor is the cooperative outcome.
Databáze: OpenAIRE