Quantum Lock: A Provable Quantum Communication Advantage
| Autor: | Kaushik Chakraborty, Mina Doosti, Yao Ma, Chirag Wadhwa, Myrto Arapinis, Elham Kashefi |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
ComputingMilieux_MANAGEMENTOFCOMPUTINGANDINFORMATIONSYSTEMS Quantum Physics Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous) FOS: Physical sciences Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Atomic and Molecular Physics and Optics |
| Zdroj: | Chakraborty, K, Doosti, M, Ma, Y, Wadhwa, C, Arapinis, M & Kashefi, E 2023, ' Quantum Lock: A Provable Quantum Communication Advantage ', Quantum, vol. 7, 1014 . https://doi.org/10.22331/q-2023-05-23-1014 |
| Popis: | Physical unclonable functions(PUFs) provide a unique fingerprint to a physical entity by exploiting the inherent physical randomness. Gao et al. discussed the vulnerability of most current-day PUFs to sophisticated machine learning-based attacks. We address this problem by integrating classical PUFs and existing quantum communication technology. Specifically, this paper proposes a generic design of provably secure PUFs, called hybrid locked PUFs(HLPUFs), providing a practical solution for securing classical PUFs. An HLPUF uses a classical PUF(CPUF), and encodes the output into non-orthogonal quantum states to hide the outcomes of the underlying CPUF from any adversary. Here we introduce a quantum lock to protect the HLPUFs from any general adversaries. The indistinguishability property of the non-orthogonal quantum states, together with the quantum lockdown technique prevents the adversary from accessing the outcome of the CPUFs. Moreover, we show that by exploiting non-classical properties of quantum states, the HLPUF allows the server to reuse the challenge-response pairs for further client authentication. This result provides an efficient solution for running PUF-based client authentication for an extended period while maintaining a small-sized challenge-response pairs database on the server side. Later, we support our theoretical contributions by instantiating the HLPUFs design using accessible real-world CPUFs. We use the optimal classical machine-learning attacks to forge both the CPUFs and HLPUFs, and we certify the security gap in our numerical simulation for construction which is ready for implementation. 47 pages, 13 figures |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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